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The impact of incentives in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 
on the business behavior of carriers 
 
Abstract: 
 
Rules are necessary to provide or shape the incentives of individuals and 
organizations. This is particularly true when free markets lead to undesirable outcomes. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 attempted to create incentives to foster 
competition. Ambiguity as well as the timing of the Act has led to delays in the 
clarification of rules and the rapid obsolescence of the document. The paper presents the 
strategies that common carriers adopted to try to tilt regulation in their favor, slow the 
entry of competitors, maintain their market leadership, and expand into other segments. 
Some of the strategies analyzed include lobbying efforts, court challenges, and lack of 
cooperation with new entrants. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
There are two common and opposite views of developments in the 
telecommunications industry after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
Some believe that competition is “developing at a robust pace”1 while others are calling 
developments in the telecommunications market a “remonopolization” of the industry.2 
How can there be such deep differences of opinion on the same subject? The problem is 
that even five years after the Act passed, there is not a clear picture about the new 
structure of the industry or the amount of competition for each of the regulated segments. 
There are several reasons why the market has not yet settled, of which most are related to 
                                                 
1 Steve Pociask, ‘We've Come A Long Way ...; But Regulatory Barriers Have Placed The 
Future On Hold’, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 27, 2000, Wednesday, B7.  
2 James Glassman, ‘For whom Bells toll; Death of telecom competition’, The Washington 
Times, December 27, 2000, A17.  
the incentives that the Act created and the actions that carriers took to maintain their 
market leadership positions.  
To understand the impact of the Telecommunications Act it is not enough to 
evaluate developments since 1996. It is also necessary to examine the issues before then 
because it is not possible to determine the impact of a particular event without 
understanding the antecedents and the state of regulation before legislation was finally 
approved. Regulation of many of the issues that are addressed in the Act had already been 
part of the Federal Communications Commission Agenda in prior years. An assessment 
of the Act therefore has to be put into that context to determine if the problems and 
uncertainty that the industry was facing were actually resolved by the law. This paper 
analyzes events in the telecommunications industry from 1991 to 2001. The objective is 
twofold: (1) to provide a systematic analysis of events by coding and classifying 
information that could help in understanding the impact of the act; (2) a qualitative 
analysis of those events to understand the incentive system of the law as well as the 
process itself. This paper presents some of the factors that shaped the regulation and the 
strategic behavior that these rules created once they were put in place. 
 
II. Incentives 
 
Incentives have been the realm of psychologists and economists. Psychologists 
have focused primarily on human behavior while economists have expanded their models 
to include firm behavior as well. In the telecommunications arena, economic analysis of 
the law focuses primarily on the economic incentives embedded in the economic models 
but has paid little attention to the incentive systems concerning competitive strategy, 
which is the realm of senior management.3 In the business literature, incentives are an 
important element of this field’s scholarly work. The focus nonetheless is on the effect of 
a company’s monetary incentives on its employees’ behavior. Compensation schemes are 
an example of this. Strategic corporate behavior is more closely related to the type of 
                                                 
3 An excellent example of this type of research is Jean Tirole and Jean-Jacques Laffont, 
Competition in Telecommunications. First ed, Munich Lectures in Economics, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
analysis that this paper presents although studies in the field of strategic behavior have 
not emphasized incentives and regulation. The contribution of this paper is in making an 
initial attempt at understanding such relationships. 
Theories in cognitive psychology that can be extrapolated to explain firm 
behavior are expectancy value theory, which explains behavior [B] as a “function of the 
expectancies [E] one has and the value [V] of the goal toward which one is working”4 
B = f (E x V) 
This means that people with multiple options will tend to choose the one that has the 
greatest value of the combination of expected success and value. This theory is relevant 
to businesses who, constrained by their budgets, can only pursue a few strategies.  
Psychologists also make a distinction between internal and external incentives. 
An internal incentive occurs when the source of the motivation to do something comes 
from within the individual. An external incentive, on the other hand, occurs when the 
motivation comes from or is generated by a party aside of the subject. This distinction is 
useful within the context of regulated industries because many of their behaviors will be 
affected by external factors such as regulation. Internal versus external incentives serves 
as a framework in part V of this paper (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Only recently have regulations focused on incentives. Normally regulation relies 
on what Barry Mitnick5 calls regulation by directive and what theories of regulation have 
termed command and control. This type of regulation is simple to the extent that 
legislators need only to set in place requirements to which the regulated have to comply. 
Without an accurate understanding of industry and firm circumstances, prescribed 
solutions may lead to serious inefficiencies. Requirements on companies, “in addition to 
their cost-ineffectiveness, command-and-control approaches discourage technological 
innovation. When regulators effectively demand the use of a particular type of scrubber 
                                                 
4 “Incentive motivation,” in Encyclopedia Britannica On-line, 
http://www.search.eb.com/bol/search?type=topic&query=incentive&DBase=Articles&x=
17&y=3, September 21, 2001. 
5 Barry M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation, First ed. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980), 342. 
or other technology, industry will generally have no incentive to develop new or better 
control technologies.”6 
 Unlike command and control regulation, incentive-based regulation attempts to 
modify behavior by changing the reward system, which would normally result in 
compliance with little or no monitoring from the regulator. Because of this, incentives 
have attracted the attention of regulators who, as a result, have written rules that try to 
incorporate them. Under command and control regulation, rules are directed as 
instructions or mandate particular conduct. Under incentive regulation a regulated firm 
has a set of alternatives of which some are more attractive than others. Also under 
incentives the regulated decides the course of action that best fit its circumstances, which 
ideally should also accomplish what the regulator wants. Wilkins and Hunt present an 
example that helps make this distinction clearer. As they describe, if Congress wanted to 
reduce the amount of air pollution it could use a command and control approach where it 
could dictate the type of smokestack that must be used or a standardized method for all of 
them. This type of regulation does not take into consideration differences across 
companies. While some of them will not need to make many adjustments to fulfill the 
standard, others will need to make substantial investments, perhaps to replace older 
equipment. An incentive system would give companies greater flexibility. 
This paper presents some information about the Act itself but more importantly 
the incentives that were created from the process of developing rules for this industry. 
Unlike other studies in telecommunications regulation, this paper does not evaluate the 
incentives embedded in the economic models of the law but instead the strategic behavior 
of firms during the process of regulatory change. 
 
III. Methodology 
 
This research analyzed new events that were subsequently coded to gather more 
generalized data about companies and issues related to the Telecommunications Act. 
                                                 
6 Timothy A. Wilkins and Terrell E. Hunt, “Agency Discretion and Advances in 
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a 
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship,” George Washington Law Review, 63, 
April, 1995, 485. 
 Sample selection. Two different coding schemes and news events were used for 
two of the sections in this paper. The first coding included the analysis of news events 
from two Regional (Bell) Holding Companies (RHCs). The reason why RHCs were 
selected was because they are more heavily regulated than their long distance 
counterparts. A random selection of news events was selected from the 1996-2001 
period. In this case only the after Act period was selected simply to determine the impact 
that regulation has had on the activities of these companies. Because the focus is 
exclusively on the Act, the authors did not consider: news pertaining to the activities of 
these companies in other countries; activities regarding affiliates such as Lucent; society 
related activities such as funding a school event; and contract awards and personnel 
appointments. None of the aforementioned exclusions appear to be related to the carriers’ 
market strategies. Although it may be argued that news are outlets that companies used to 
develop positive images, it is difficult to determine what is manipulation and what is real. 
On average a large enough amount of news would cancel out bias related to 
manipulation. The sample size was determined using a formula from Hinkle, Wiersma 
and Jurs.7 
 For sections VI and VII of this paper the selection of news was only of events 
related to interconnection and universal service. These were the only two issues analyzed 
in this paper because there were considered the most important under the many others for 
which the FCC needed to established rules. 
Coding criteria I. The codification of these events consisted first of “1s” and 
“0s” to determine if the source of the action was due to an internal (coded as 1) decision 
or in response to an external requirement (coded as 0). An external incentive was selected 
if the company was forced to do something by an outside agent. For example, a 
regulatory body could force a carrier to improve its service by making it subject to fines. 
Internal incentives pertain to a company’s own initiative to improve its market share, 
revenues, customer service, or other factors. The second type of code addresses the 
reason for such a decision. Six reasons were identified: (1) a regulatory requirement, (2) a 
regulatory requirement with negative consequences for the industry, (3) internal 
                                                 
7 William Wiersma, Dennis E. Hinkle, and Stephen G. Jurs, Applied Statistics for the 
Behavioral Sciences, First ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998). 
corporate initiative, (4) corporate initiative with negative consequences for consumers, 
(5) newly available technology, (6) a response to a competitor’s action. 
In the coding process if it was not clear what the source of such action was, a 
series of options were outlined and then the one that was the most likely was selected. 
For example, a carrier could begin offering Internet access to a certain community. There 
are at least two reasons why they may have decided to do this. First, the technology could 
be more prevalent and they could offer it. Second, competition could force them to offer 
this service. The code selection would be as follows: assume, for example, that the 
technology was available but there was no competition. In this case the company could 
have simply not entered the market and be content simply continuing with the services 
that it is currently providing. Although this scenario is possible, providing Internet access 
is a service that, regardless of the existence of competition, they would like to provide 
because of the potential added revenues that can be generated. Assuming now that the 
company could have added this service but the technology did not exist then it could not 
have offered it even if it so desired. Under these circumstances the code was attributed to 
technology as a catalyst for service expansion for the carriers. It the technology was 
developed before 1996 then the source of the decision was attributed to the corporation. 
Rate decreases were coded as corporate because it is not clear if the reduction is a result 
of competition or of tariff reorganization within the company. If the company did not 
develop the technology, the event was coded as a technology source because it could not 
have provided such a service if they had not had it available. If the technology was 
developed inside the company then it was considered a corporate source. Activities that 
carriers were not allowed to provide under previous regulation but that they are now able 
to offer were attributed to regulation. 
Coding criteria II. The criteria for sections VI and VII of this paper are 
presented in appendix one and two of this paper. When the news item only made a 
tangential comment about the issue of concerned, it was not coded. 
Reliability. Intercoder reliability was analyzed by drawing a random subsample 
of news events from the overall sample, based on a formula by Lacy and Riffe.8 The two 
authors coded the sub-sample. The percentage agreement and as the kappa value are 
indicated in each of the tables that were produced for this research. 
Selection of sources. To reduce the possibility of bias due to the variability of 
sources from databases that combine publications, the authors chose to identify 
exclusively publications that focus on telecommunications alone. Nine sources that focus 
on this industry alone were identified. From this original list we selected those that were 
published for the entire period under study. There were only two periodicals that were 
published during the 1991-2001 period. One was Informa Telecoms, which had to be 
excluded because it focuses primarily on international news. The remaining source was 
Communications Daily. 
Selection of search terms. To reduce the possibility of bias due to search terms 
the authors conducted sample searches to find all possible terms used in the industry 
press to refer to the same issue. Additionally the terms used in the Telecommunications 
Act were also selected as search terms for the particular issue under study. Once a 
complete set of search terms was identified, these were combined as the search term to be 
used in the database. 
Selection of issues for the coding of parts VI and VII. Only issues that were 
unsettled by the Act were selected, specifically interconnection and universal service. 
Unsettled refers to the issues that the Act directed the Commission to define the rules. 
The reason for focusing on these issues alone is because without clear rules in the Act 
companies still have an opportunity to influence the FCC to develop rules that favor 
them. It is assumed here that in the absence of specified rules, carriers will have an 
incentive to engage in activities that will influence the rules in their favor. 
  
IV. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
 
                                                 
8 Stephen Lacy and Daniel Riffe, “Sampling Error and Selecting Intercoder Reliability 
Samples for Normal Content Categories,” Journalism and Mass Communication 
Quarterly, Vol. 73, no. 4 (1997): 963-973. 
The Telecommunications Act is a complex document that attempts to accomplish 
multiple things. Its primary goal is deregulation of the telecommunications, cable, and 
broadcasting industries. This process is complicated because it encompassing all of the 
industries under the umbrella of the FCC. While the Act mentions many issues it does not 
provide specific rules for many of them. Given such limitations, the Act includes 
instructions to the FCC for the implementation of rules on issues that could only be 
outlined in the 1996 Act. Like many laws the Act contains clauses that are aimed to 
prevent regulators from overstepping their powers against the regulated. There are thus a 
number of clauses that indicates the things that government agencies can or cannot do. 
Similarly, as there are clauses that limit agencies demands to companies, there are also 
clauses intended to extend their privileges. While the first one is intended to prevent 
regulatory abuses, the second is intended to provide a mechanism for regulators to issue 
additional rules in case the existing rules fail to address a problem. 
The existence of clauses intended to extend the rights of regulators could pose 
problems in the future because companies, knowing the discretion of these government 
agencies, will have an incentive to lobby to have rules written in their favor. As can be 
seen in Table 3, after the Act there were multiple challenges to orders that were being 
developed as well as to those that had already been issued. Additionally there are clauses 
where the Commission is given discretionary powers to extent the content of the law but 
at the same time give State commissions similar powers. While the intent of these clauses 
is to preserve the federalist spirit of the law, it leads to multiple problems. 
Having states outline their own rules can give carriers multiple forums to play 
commissions against each other so that regulators outline rules that most benefit them. 
Alternatively, assuming that they are unable to get what they want they may simply 
operate and leave their most innovative initiatives to those states that have less stringent 
rules, effectively forum shopping. Differing rules between the federal and state 
commissions could also lead companies to comply with multiple requirements, 
effectively increasing their operating costs and indirectly leading to higher rates for their 
services. 
Even though the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions 
provides an outlet for state commissions and federal regulators to coordinate their work, 
there have been cases in the course of the implementation of the Act where the 
differences between the two levels of government could not be reconciled, leading to 
lengthy court cases. This was the case of the interconnection rules, which is presented 
later in the paper. The Act also includes clauses designed to protect the regulated. Such 
clauses specify things that companies can do, may want to do, and should not be forced to 
do protecting them from regulators’ unreasonable requests. Like any other rule there are 
also administrative elements that determine procedures to follow. 
 Among the issues that Congress left undefined were Sec. 227c, Protection of 
subscriber’s privacy rights; Sec. 227d, Technical and procedural standards for facsimile, 
artificial or prerecorded messages; Sec. 228, Regulation of pay per call services and the 
possible extension of rules to data per call; Sec. 229, Communications assistance for law 
enforcement; Sec 245, Universal Service rules; Sec. 251d, Interconnection 
implementation rules; Sec. 257, Elimination of market barriers; Sec. 259, Infrastructure 
sharing regulations; and Sec. 276, Provisions for payphone services. These sections 
correspond only to Title II Common Carriers. Many of the issues that needed to be 
defined were highly complex and controversial, which must have left the staff at the 
Commission thinly spread. It is not surprising that some of these issues took months and 
even years to get settled. This paper focuses on the key issues of interconnection and 
universal service. These issues are the most important because they have the most direct 
effect on competition in the industry. 
Negotiations for legislation like the Telecommunications Act can be lengthy and 
complicated because of the diversity of issues and the strong influence and power that 
companies in the affected industries had. Great contention existed between the RHCs and 
the long distance carriers about when and how each would be permitted to enter the 
other’s market.9 Companies organized themselves to achieve greater lobbying strength. 
The RHCs formed the Alliance for Competitive Communications and complained about 
the development of new regulation rather than the deregulation that had been promised. 
                                                 
9 “Republicans May Have Sunk Telecom Bill For This Year; Congress: But A Panel Is 
Already Working To Gain The Support Needed To Pass It As Soon As Possible,” Los 
Angeles Times, Section: Business, December 23, 1995, D-1. 
The long distance carriers formed the Competitive Long Distance Coalition and were 
pleased with the law.10  
 
V. An overview of the impact of the Act 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the incentive system and the regulatory 
process before and after the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 
impact that it has had on company strategies. To accomplish this the research was 
conducted in several stages. First an analysis of news events about carriers’ activities was 
coded to determine the extent to which regulation had an effect on their daily operations. 
This first analysis was primarily exploratory to set up a context for the Act. In particular 
the intent was to see if rules were developed to such an extent that it was affecting the 
corporate behavior of carriers. The tables below present the results of this exploratory 
analysis.  
Table 1 
Bell South Analysis of Decisions 
Source of decision  
  Regulation Regulation 
negative 
Corporate 
decision 
Corporate 
negative  
Technology Competition Total 
External 
incentive 
Count 14     1 15 
 % of Total 10.3%     .7% 11.0% 
Internal 
incentive 
Count 21 4 25 9 10 51 121 
 % of Total 15.4% 2.9% 18.4% 6.6% 7.4% 37.5% 89.0% 
Total Count 35 4 25 9 10 52 136 
% of Total 25.7% 2.9% 18.4% 6.6% 7.4% 38.2% 100.0% 
χ2 = 55.3 Sig. = .000 
Table 2 
Ameritech Analysis of Decisions 
Source of decision   
  Regulation Regulation 
negative 
Corporate 
decision 
Corporate 
negative  
Technology Competition Total 
External 
incentive 
Count 29   1  1 31 
 % of Total 18.5%   .6%  .6% 19.7% 
Internal 
incentive 
Count 28 4 61 17 3 13 126 
 % of Total 17.8% 2.5% 38.9% 10.8% 1.9% 8.3% 80.3% 
Total Count 57 4 61 18 3 14 157 
 % of Total 36.3% 2.5% 38.9% 11.5% 1.9% 8.9% 100.0% 
χ2 = 40.4 Sig. = .000 
                                                 
10 “No 'Date Certain'; Senate Democrats Release Alternative Telecommunications 
Reform Bill,” Communications Daily, Vol. 15, No. 32, February 16, 1995, 1. 
These tables show that the vast majority of decisions made by these companies 
were motivated internally. This means that corporate actions result from the initiatives of 
company executives and not from a regulatory agency mandating them to do something. 
Even though both of these are local carriers they reacted differently to their market 
circumstances. Bell South, for example, made decisions that were intended to address 
competitive issues while for Ameritech this was of little concern. On the contrary the 
later one was occupied instead with new corporate initiatives. Regulation had an impact 
on their activities although Ameritech seemed to be more affected with 36% of the news 
events analyzed attributed to regulation. The differences on the impact that regulation has 
on each of them vary depending on the states where they provide services. Some public 
utility commissions (PUCs) are more interventionist than others and this could therefore 
lead to some companies being more affected than others by regulation. The broad 
analysis of these events simply indicates that regulation indeed has constraining effects 
on companies’ behavior. Since we made the distinction of negative effects, regulation 
appears to be primarily for the benefit of society in spite of the constraints that it poses on 
companies. There were relatively few events that were considered to have negative 
effects. These were 2.5% for Ameritech and almost 3% for Bell South. 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the degree to which regulation has an 
effect on the daily activities of these companies. Some people may argue that regulation 
should be implemented such that it is transparent and does not dominate the company’s 
market decisions. When regulation leads companies to make most of their decisions 
comply with government rules, the danger is that inefficiencies in the industry will 
emerge that could threaten its long-term economic health. In the case of the 
telecommunications industry regulation has had a substantial as is shown in Tables 
1 and 2. 
 
VI. Interconnection 
 
To understand corporate behavior before, during, and after the passage of the Act, 
it is important to be aware of the circumstances surrounding these regulatory 
developments. In the early 1990s computing technology was evolving rapidly and, with 
the emergence of the graphical Internet browser companies began to see additional 
revenue opportunities. Similarly at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, Vice-
president Al Gore was a strong supporter of the development of an information 
superhighway. Part of this vision included the widespread ability to exchange 
computerized video images, sophisticated graphics, sound, high-speed data and video 
transfers, conferencing and video on demand. In the summer of 1992 Al Gore and George 
Brown introduced the Information Infrastructure Technology Act and in 1993 the Clinton 
Administration issued a report called “Information in the 21st Century.”11 The enthusiasm 
and support that the administration showed for technology, and specifically 
telecommunications, led to a heightened interest in investments related to advanced 
services. It was at this time that telecommunications companies started their video on 
demand trials and telecommunication companies became more interested in expanding 
their services beyond their own markets. 
Provision of telecommunication services nonetheless was something that attracted 
the attention of other companies, in particular carriers that were serving private 
corporations. In a market that seemed full of opportunities, it was natural for these 
carriers to want to expand their services to residential customers as well. This nonetheless 
required the cooperation of incumbent carriers that would have to allow them to 
interconnect with their facilities. There were attempts by incoming carriers to obtain 
interconnection even before 1996. Teleport, for example, was one of the first companies 
to request interconnection with an RHC. This was so that it could expand services offered 
to its New York clients.12 Companies such as Teleport pressured public officials to issue 
regulations that would make it easier for them to obtain access to the incumbent’s 
infrastructure. 
In the interest of fostering competition some states issued regulations to mandate 
interconnection. As early as 1991 the FCC had already issued orders to mandate 
                                                 
11 “Prepared Statement Of John Sculley, Chairman, Apple Computer and Chairman, 
Computer Systems Policy Project Before the House Telecommunications and Finance 
Subcommittee,” Federal News Service, January 19, 1993. 
12 Diane S. Boiler, “The Year in Review,” Public Utilities Fortnightly, January 1 1991, 
44. 
interconnection. Table 3 shows that several interconnection agreements had already been 
negotiated among companies before the 1996 Act. 
At this time the RHCs wanted to offer new services and petitioned state PUCs for 
permission to enter the long distance market. In exchange they offered to allow access to 
their networks. At this time incumbent telecommunication carriers were heavily regulated 
and considerably restricted in the services that they were allowed to provide. Because of 
their monopoly status primarily at the state level it would have been difficult for them to 
simply request to be allowed into the long distance service, which was the first area 
where they wanted to expand. They therefore had an incentive to offer in exchange 
access to their networks to requesting communication carriers. 
Most interconnection requests were handled at the state level and, as a result, 
several PUCs issued regulations to foster competition, sometimes even at the local level 
as was the case in Chicago which proposed in 1992 a “Telecommunications Free Trade 
Zone,”13 an initiative that was first suggested by Ameritech. At that time 17 states already 
allowed competition in local exchange service while 18 were formally considering 
allowing competition and four allowed it informally.14 While there were some states that 
issued regulations others refused to address the issue and requested instead that the FCC 
resolve the matter. 
Although there may have been some companies that, under the possibility of 
being allowed to expand their services and markets, may have an incentive to open their 
networks, there are also signs of refusal on the part of the RHCs that made it difficult for 
entrants to gain access to national networks. At that time the excuse from incumbents was 
that it would cost them too much to improve their networks.  
Because rules were not yet developed, companies had to present their plans to 
either state commissions and on occasions to the FCC. Decisions then had to be made 
with respect to their requests regarding provision of enhanced services or even entering 
the long distance market.  
                                                 
13 Communications Daily, February 4 1992, 4. 
14 “Common Carrier Competition,” FCC, Common Carrier Bureau, Spring 1995, 6,  
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/fcc-link.html 
When the issue was brought to the FCC for consideration, the commission was already 
working on issues of interconnection concerning number portability for 800 numbers.15 
From a strategic perspective, 800 number portability was of interest to carriers because it 
would help them to keep customers that needed to maintain the same telephone number 
even after they moved. Additionally these were, for the most part, business clients with 
larger accounts than their residential counterparts. Interconnection with other companies 
was part of the concessions they had to make to satisfy a customer need. Maintaining 
these accounts was therefore a strong incentive for them to cooperate. RHC willingness 
to allow interconnection to would-be competitors turned into resistance. In the case of 
number portability, companies were able to maintain revenues but interconnection with 
competitors represented instead revenue decline. They therefore put greater emphasis on 
the costs of allowing such network connections. They also argued that that it would have 
negative effects in terms of network quality, finances, and job losses.16 They emphasized 
that interconnection could threaten networks due to technical difficulties. Table 3 
presents data about the number of interconnections denials that happened before and after 
the Act was passed. 
Incumbent LECs lose the most when they allow interconnection. They receive 
lower revenues because of the expense of accommodating the technical needs of other 
carriers and then having to share the market. When one carrier opens its network while 
the others remain closed, the carrier that opened its market can lose considerable 
revenues. This is because of added competition in its home market without the ability to 
participate in the other carriers’ closed networks. In the meantime the carrier that kept its 
market closed maintains its monopoly while extending its market. If they all decide to 
keep their markets closed they then remain as the dominant carriers with no challenges. 
The dominant strategy is for carriers to maintain closed markets 
While the FCC was being pressured from competitive carriers to mandate 
interconnection, Congress was instead debating whether or not they should remove MFJ 
restrictions so that RHCs could enter the long distance market. In May of 1992 The 
                                                 
15 “Callers Won't Notice Change; Phone Industry Drafts Transition To 800 Portability,” 
Communications Daily, December 19 1991, 2. 
16 “Vote Seen As 3-1/2 to 1-1/2; Physical Interconnection Issue Creating Conflicts,” 
Communications Daily, October 7 1992, 4. 
House Commercial Law Subcommittee passed the Brooks MFJ Bill (HR-5096) that was 
intended to slow down the entry of RHCs to information services, manufacturing and 
long distance.17  
 The FCC was more open to the idea of deregulation than Congress In 1992 the 
FCC issued an order requiring “LECs with revenues of over $100 million annually to 
offer expanded interconnection to all interested parties, permitting competitors and high 
volume users to terminate their own special access transmission facilities at LEC central 
offices.”18 
 
Table 3 
 
Interconnection Issues 
 
ISSUES Total 
  Interconnection 
agreement 
Federal rules 
established 
Court 
challenge 
Organizational 
challenge 
State rules 
established 
Company refusal 
for interconnection 
Individual 
company 
review 
Federal rules 
to be 
determined 
 
Before the 
1996 Act 
Count 25 21 5 9 11 11 28 68 178 
 % of Total 6.3% 5.3% 1.3% 2.3% 2.8% 2.8% 7.1% 17.2% 44.9% 
After the 
1996 Act 
Count 50 8 25 38 12 40 29 16 218 
 % of Total 12.6% 2.0% 6.3% 9.6% 3.0% 10.1% 7.3% 4.0% 55.1% 
Total Count 75 29 30 47 23 51 57 84 396 
 % of Total 18.9% 7.3% 7.6% 11.9% 5.8% 12.9% 14.4% 21.2% 100.0% 
χ2 = 91.02 Sig. = .000 
 
After the Act was passed things did not get easier but rather became more 
complicated. Prior to the Act state PUCs were handling some of the interconnections 
issues and were even able to intermediate some disputes. This nonetheless did not appear 
to be an ideal situation considering that without national rules, states had to devise their 
own criteria for interconnection. The Act therefore seemed like a solution to the emerging 
chaotic situation of state rules and carrier interconnection negotiations. While in theory 
the Act was supposed to settle the issue and provide guidelines for interconnection, it led 
instead to an even more chaotic situation. The 1996 Act left it to the FCC to determine 
the rules for interconnection, providing only general guidelines. Because these rules were 
not specified from the beginning there was ample room for interpretation. As can be seen 
                                                 
17 “Markey Gearing Up; Brooks Mfj Bill Passed, 10-6, By House Judiciary Unit,” 
Communications Daily, May 29 1992, 1. 
18 Communications Daily, September 21 1992, 6. 
in Table 3, many of the news events related to interconnection refer to the many aspects 
of interconnection that needed to be determined by the FCC. News events related to 
interconnection agreements doubled after the Act. This in fact meant that the 
interconnection negotiations that had been agreed upon before the Act were company-
specific and did not address issues that had greater impact on the entire industry. Unlike 
these individual agreements, the Act had to be concerned with the greater impact of these 
agreements on competition, incentives for infrastructure investment, national technical 
and regulatory standards, and universal service.  
Because the Act left the issue to be determined by the FCC, carriers had an 
incentive to lobby to interpret the law in their favor. Soon after the Act was passed and 
even before the Commission had an opportunity to draft these rules, the Association for 
Local Telecommunication Services (ALTS), which represents competitive access 
providers (CAPs), submitted a document entitled Handbook for the FCC where they 
specify their interpretation and the things that they expected the FCC to do.19  
Even before the FCC issued its interconnection order there was considerable 
enthusiasm on the part both of the competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) and the 
RHCs about the possibility of extending their markets. Bell Atlantic and Ameritech were 
among the first to submit their applications to both PUCs and the FCC to obtain approval 
to begin providing long distance service. This happened after only one competitor had 
signed an interconnection agreement with it. The company believed that this was enough 
to fulfill the interconnection requirements of Secs. 521 and 252. These were premature 
applications that were quickly denied. The Table 3 heading of individual company 
evaluation provides some indication of requests that were submitted to the FCC and state 
commissions regarding interconnection issues.  
Once the order for interconnection was issued20 there was considerable debate 
from both the CLECs as well as the RHCs. Initially it appeared as if the RHCs were 
willing to cooperate on interconnection agreements although they expected the 
authorization to provide long distance service to be almost automatic. Although it is not 
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Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,” 
(http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/local_competition/fcc96325.html: 1996). 
something that they explicitly recognized, it is possible that the frustration with the 
application process to offer interexchange access also contributed to their reluctance to 
facilitate interconnection to competing carriers. As the years passed there was an 
increasing number of court challenges. The issue became increasingly complex and 
confrontational. There were multiple issues where there were differences of opinion. The 
most important was the calculation of rates for unbundled network elements (UNEs). 
This was nonetheless only the beginning of a series of company and court challenges to 
the interconnection rules. It began with the formula used to calculate the rates and 
escalated to include issues such as property rights for third party equipment on 
collocation agreements, the quality of the networks to be leased, the network elements 
included in the UNEs list, the obligations and rights of wireless carriers, and the impact 
of leased networks on access charges and universal service. It was clear that Congress 
and the FCC underestimated the complexity of the issue. Table 3 presents some 
information regarding the number of news items that made allusion to court challenges 
before and after the Act. From a corporate strategy perspective one could argue that court 
challenges could in fact help to slow the entrance of a competitor. There were 
nonetheless issues that indeed had serious implications. Rates alone were crucial because 
a low tariff could have negative affect on their revenues and reduce the incentives for 
carriers to continue building a state of the art infrastructure and perhaps such low rates 
could have even threatened the survival of some of the incumbents. Low rates, as they 
argued could also eliminate incentives to foster facilities based competition. Other 
arguments, such as equating physical collocation with stealing property, were more 
questionable. 
Aside from rates, common carriers also tried to limit the network elements that 
they were obliged to lease. Originally the Commission prepared a list that included all 
network elements. Carriers naturally challenged this list in an effort to slow and limit the 
amount of competition that would otherwise come into their markets. The Supreme Court 
that reviewed the list requested that the Commission revise it to take into consideration 
the “necessary” standard and the “impair” standard of the Act.21 Rather than revise parts 
of the list, the FCC instead made it longer by including conditioned loops as well as line 
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sharing.22 The list was challenged once more at the Eighth Circuit, where the court stated 
that the Act only required the unbundling of existing network elements and not of 
elements that may exist in the future. They also reasoned that incumbents are not obliged 
to “cater to every desire of every requesting carrier”23 FCC officials at this time claimed 
that the Supreme Court had already decided on this issue and did not change their 
position. The dispute has continued. 
Because the FCC established rules that tended to favor competitors over RHC 
incumbents one of the strategies that incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) utilized 
to prevent these rules from prevailing was to accuse the FCC of overreaching its authority 
by imposing rules at the national level when the Act had specified that states had the 
authority to devise their own interconnection rules.24 The existence of clauses in the Act 
that gave both the FCC and state commissions power over regulation gave incumbents a 
reason to complain. Before the Act and interconnection orders were issued, the 
establishment of national rules was welcome. Once they were issued, states found 
themselves having to decide which rules to apply: their own or those issued by the FCC. 
This was the case in Florida, Ohio, and California, which had to put on hold their ruling 
processes to wait for the FCC to issue its interconnection order. Although the ILECs were 
the ones that first challenged the authority of the FCC to determine pricing rules for the 
entire country, state commissions followed up by making similar complaints. States that 
already had passed interconnection rules were concerned about their validity. 
Other controversial issues included the formula used for interconnection rates and 
UNE deaveraging, which could lead to higher rates to subscribers in low density areas. 
Some commissioners were concerned that rural communities would face considerably 
higher rates than their urban counterparts if deaveraging was used. This was also 
unforeseen because the idea of deaveraging was simply to allow carriers to have lower 
rates for those areas where services provision was lower. This implied that some areas of 
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the country would have lower rates for UNEs than others. Court challenges took such a 
long time to be resolved that PUCs had to resort to interim rates waiting for those cases to 
be sorted out. 
In summary, incumbents did not expect to have their applications rejected and 
wanted to enter long distance markets quickly. Unable to enter long distance, they instead 
tried to limit the entry of competitors. Their strategies included first trying to influence 
the rules that would come out of the FCC and second challenging them. The court 
challenges cannot be seen as primarily frivolous as there were legitimate concerns. 
Incumbents were also successful at having PUCs support their cause. These legal battles 
effectively slowed the entrance of competitors for approximately four years until courts 
reinstated the authority of the FCC to determine the standards for interconnection. 
Because of this and all the contracts that were done on an interim basis, it is expected that 
more conflicts will arise at the time of renewal.  
The process of interconnection has stabilized and has become more formalized 
having third party tests on incumbent infrastructure to determine if they are adequate for 
serving competitors. This prevents the negotiations from becoming too contentious and 
provides a less partisan evaluation of the incumbent’s willingness to cooperate with 
competitors. These impartial evaluations serve them well when they submit their 
applications for the provision of long distance services. 
Table 3 shows that before the Act was passed there were some interconnections 
negotiated but the signing of the Act opened the door to other interested parties that 
would not otherwise have requested entrance. It would have been difficult for small 
entrants to negotiate interconnection contracts without regulatory obligations imposed on 
incumbents. The regulation did not make it easier but there was at least some pressure to 
comply. The main problem is the incentive system that was embedded in the 
interconnection rules. It required incumbents to share an infrastructure that they built 
with would be competitors. This regulatory obligation contradicts rational business 
behavior and consequently there is very little interest in complying. While there were 
refusals for interconnection prior to the Act, there were also refusals afterward. The 
emergence of broadband networks has added yet another challenge to the FCC. 
Incumbents do not want this upgraded networks to be part of UNEs and asked for an 
exception. A more recent attempt to try to exclude broadband from interconnection 
agreements was from Bell South, which set up a separate unit for advance services alone 
that are not subject to regulation. By doing this they have effectively taken these services 
out of the UNEs. Interconnection of broadband networks is still to be decided. 
 
VII. Universal Service 
 
Universal service concerns have been an issue of contention for the FCC since the 
early 1990s. At that time with the emergence of competitive carriers, public utility 
commissions became concerned about contributions to the universal service fund, which 
were only required of RHCs. Initial discussions were held regarding the services to be 
included under universal service support. Because universal service was related to 
interconnection, the telecommunications regulations issued by PUCs often addressed 
both issues. The close relationship between interconnection and universal service made 
both issues more complex. Rates for unbundled network elements would have to take into 
consideration contributions to the universal service fund if the FCC were to require them 
from all carriers including new entrants. Discussions that were taking place before the 
Act concerned the services that would or would not be included for support. While PUCs 
wanted to resist the support of emerging technologies as part of universal service, there 
was some interest on the part of carriers to include them. Telecommunications companies 
would have liked some of these services to be subsidized because this would increase 
their revenues. This has given them an incentive to lobby for their inclusion. 
During discussions taking place at the state level, incumbent carriers argued that 
they would be at a disadvantage if they were required to contribute while new entrants 
were exempt and lobbied to prevent this.25 Competitive carriers on the other hand argued 
that the interconnection charges that incumbents receive should be enough to cover the 
costs of providing services to rural areas.26 LECs also argued that with fewer subscribers 
the resources of the universal service fund would be depleted. In spite of the complexity 
of the issue and strong lobbying from incumbents some states issued regulations on the 
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subject. Table 4 presents information about the number of news events that made allusion 
to state rules established as well as the amount of news addressing company challenges to 
the law. This shows that several states had established rules even before the Act. For 
states without regulatory attempts companies often negotiated with commissioners to 
reduce regulations and in exchange offer to improve universal service provisions.27 
The analysis of events shows that few rules were implemented at the federal level 
compared to the amount of activity that happened after the Act was passed. Carriers 
criticized the establishment of interim rules until a more comprehensive study was carried 
out. It is surprising to see in Table 4 that most of the news regarding regulation was about 
the things that still have to be done. This was true both before and after the Act. The few 
orders issued by the FCC addressed the increases in the contributions that carriers had to 
make to the fund. Similarly orders CC Doc. 91-141, Transport Phase I, and CC Doc. 80-
286, which also addressed interconnection and competition issues, left universal service 
contributions untouched. Carriers that traditionally served rural communities complained 
that such rules opened the market to competitors and that their presence would lead to 
reduced revenues. They argued that this would negatively affect the provision of services 
to rural and some residential users.28 From an incentives perspective it is clear that 
carriers would want to avoid losing the support that they had enjoyed up to that point. 
There was therefore considerable debate on the part of carriers providing services to rural 
communities to make modifications to the law such that they would not lose such 
resources after competition happened.29 During the period prior to the Act some carriers 
objected to a model suggesting subsidies paid directly to  carriers. 
As can be seen by the χ2, the difference in the number of news items for the 
periods before and after the act is not significant. Although this is an overall test of 
independence it nonetheless gives some indication of the small differences that existed 
before and after the fact with respect to the areas of uncertainty. In this respect it could be 
said that the Act failed to resolve universal service issues. 
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Opportunities In Switched Transport,” Communications Daily, 1993, 1. 
29 Communications Daily, September 12 1994, 8. 
Table 4 
  
Universal Service Analysis of issues 
 
ISSUE Total 
  Federal 
regulation 
established 
Court 
challenge 
Organizational 
challenge 
State 
regulation 
established 
Contribution 
determination 
Individual 
company 
evaluation 
Federal rules to 
be determined 
State regulations 
to be determined 
 
Before the 1996 
Act 
Count 5  11 3 3 8 39 12 81 
 % of Total 2.2%  4.8% 1.3% 1.3% 3.5% 17.0% 5.2% 35.2% 
After the 1996 
Act 
Count 20 8 31 5 7 13 53 12 149 
 % of Total 8.7% 3.5% 13.5% 2.2% 3.0% 5.7% 23.0% 5.2% 64.8% 
Total Count 25 8 42 8 10 21 92 24 230 
 % of Total 10.9% 3.5% 18.3% 3.5% 4.3% 9.1% 40.0% 10.4% 100.0% 
χ2 = 13.5 Sig. = .094 Kappa =  
 
Universal service, like interconnection provisions, were left undetermined by the 
Act. As stated in Sec. 254: 
FEDERAL-STATE JOINT BOARD ON UNIVERSAL SERVICE.—Within one 
month after the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 
Commission shall institute and refer to a Federal-State Joint Board under section 
410(c) a proceeding to recommend changes to any of its regulations in order to 
implement sections 214(e) and this section, including the definition of the services 
that are supported by Federal universal service support mechanisms and a specific 
timetable for completion of such recommendations.30 
 
Even after the Act there were some state commissions that were still trying to 
develop rules for interconnection and universal service. California, for example, issued its 
universal service rules in August 1996.31 
Because the rules for universal service still had to be determine by the FCC there 
were several reports sent to the FCC to influence the amount of contributions. GTE, 
Pacific Bell, and SNET were among the companies that prepared reports.32 Similarly, 
hearings organized by the Commission were highly contested as particular carriers 
disagreed on the formula to be used to determine costs as well as the criteria used to 
determine which geographical areas needed subsidies.33 Table 3 presents information 
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33 “Industry Offers Views; Joint Board Contemplates Universal Service Approaches,” 
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about the number of news items that talked about the determination of contributions 
before and after the Act. It shows that these remain an issue of discussion after the Act. 
Contention was also aroused among carriers because the incumbents argued that 
competitive carriers could already have been receiving a subsidy if they bought UNEs 
and are exempt from paying interconnection charges. The timing that was established to 
determine the rules for interconnection and universal service was also an issue of debate. 
In the Act rules for interconnection were due before those for universal service and 
carriers were concerned about the fund falling short of what was necessary to support US 
programs. In this case Bell South, which was advocating this view, wanted the 
Commission to maintain access charges until the rules for Universal Service were 
determined. This was obviously an argument to maintain such a revenue flow. 
Competitive carriers rejected this policy by saying that they would be paying double fees 
for UNEs and access charges. They instead argued that they would only pay to support 
the universal service fund and its two associated programs, Lifeline and Link-up.  
In the discussion about allocation of funds a recommendation was made about 
granting funds to carriers based on pre-established criteria such as quality of service, 
level of interconnection, number portability, and the geographical extent of the network. 
This type of criteria nonetheless increases the monitoring costs of the regulator. 
The Act was signed at a time when technology was changing rapidly and the 
Internet had become a major force in all types of social and commercial activities. This 
made it necessary to consider proposals to provide universal service funding to connect 
libraries, schools and rural health centers to the Internet. Similarly wireless technology 
was gaining support and regulators had to consider these carriers as possibilities for 
carriers of last resort (COLR) in rural communities.  
In selecting carriers receiving support to serve rural communities, regulators 
encountered a dilemma. On the one hand they wanted to have competition but at the rural 
level they may have only one option. Having only one carrier meant that these 
communities would have no choice and the government would then be obliged to 
regulate its rates and services, something it wanted to eliminate with the Act. The 
calculation of costs to serve rural communities was also controversial. From an incentives 
perspective the ILECs would like their costs to be the ones used to determine the number 
of subsidies they receive to serve these communities. The long distance carriers on the 
other hand rejected this formula because they justifiably believed that the ILECs without 
much monitoring would have an incentive to inflate their costs. The long distance carriers 
therefore preferred proxy costs to be used to calculate these subsidies. Independently of 
the model used regulators were aware that all types of subsidy mechanisms had to be 
dealt with simultaneously to determine the amount of money that each of these carriers 
had to contribute. The process was more complex than expected and by June 1997 
regulators were still looking at the models to be used for universal service and expected 
at the time that implementation would then take place by 1999.34 
Interexchange carriers (IXCs) saw reform in universal service as an opportunity to 
eliminate access charges completely to be replaced instead with subscriber line charges. 
They wanted to have transfers made from carriers servicing high cost areas to those 
serving low cost ones.35 In defense RHCs argued that access charges pay for universal 
service and that if they were to be modified they will have to be sufficient to cover these 
costs. Because of objection from IXCs, they propose to have an access charge that is not 
related to use but instead is a flat fee per line. 
Added to the contention between the IXCs and the LECs, an additional set of 
players needed to be included in the discussion. These were information service 
providers, such as those offering Internet access, that were subject to less regulation. 
Because information service providers are not defined as telecommunications carriers 
they do not have to pay universal service fees. Some policymakers argued that the 
telephone companies would be subsidizing the computer industry if they received funds 
for Internet connections.36 
Allocation of universal service funds was not something that affected carriers 
alone. Because part of the universal service plan was to wire schools, libraries, and health 
centers in rural communities, there was considerable disagreement between the states and 
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the FCC. This is because each state allocates funds to schools differently and each state 
wanted to have the flexibility to do so in its own way. There was thus an incentive on the 
part of the state to try to keep the determination of subsidies to schools at the state rather 
than the federal level. There were nonetheless some CLEC organizations such as the 
American Communications Services Inc. (ACSI) that did not want states to be involved 
and submitted letter to the FCC asking for federal preemption of state rules.37 
Another area where there are conflicting incentives is between small companies 
and large companies. While the smaller carriers would like to be completely exempt from 
regulation, larger carriers want them to have the same regulatory burden as anyone else. 
Although smaller carriers can be exempt, they nonetheless have to prove that they are 
small enough to be exempt. 
Universal service issues were not adequately addressed in the 1996 Act. The lack 
of rules in the law itself provided carriers with opportunities to lobby for their interests 
and slow the process. A great incentive existed for them to challenge implementation 
regulations because of the possibility of losing universal service support and revenue 
from access fees. The confusion that existed before the Act continued to prevail 
afterward. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was clearly necessary because it 
deregulated areas that would have remained stagnant if there had not been a loosening of 
the rules to allow carriers to enter other information service areas and eventually the 
interexchange market. The rules nonetheless did not make things easier as the law 
included segments that provided few guidelines. This provided ample room for carriers to 
engage in substantial lobbying to influence FCC regulations in their favor. Because the 
issues that Congress and subsequently the FCC had to deal with were highly complex, 
there was great debate. The implementation of the law led to even more confusion than 
there was before the Act passed. In this respect the law was not helpful. Technological 
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evolution also contributed to making implementation difficult. As rules were being 
devised, new applications were developed that inevitably would have made any 
regulation obsolete at the time it was issued. On universal service, for example, while the 
commission was focusing primarily on support to rural communities, the rapid evolution 
of the Internet made it necessary to consider this infrastructure part of universal service 
concerns. Similarly, at the time the act was drafted broadband communications had not 
been implemented and were later an issue of contention when they had to be considered 
part of the UNEs list. The Act provided some relief with respect to interconnection but 
was inadequate on universal service issues. 
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Appendix 1 
Interconnection: operationalization of codes 
Interconnection 
agreement 
An agreement is signed between two companies or with the help of a regulator. An incumbent 
carrier reports about its interconnection agreements. A carrier or PUC reports about 
interconnection agreements being made to date. 
Federal rules 
established 
The FCC issues an order related to the implementation of interconnection related issues. The 
FCC successfully clarifies an issue of contention. Congress passes a bill pertaining to 
interconnection. 
Court challenge Companies files a lawsuit against either the FCC or PUCs. 
Organizational 
challenge to the 
FCC 
When an individual company, an association representing carriers, or a consumer group sends 
letters of concern to the FCC about its policies on interconnection. When members of congress 
challenge the actions of the FCC this is considered an organizational challenge because they 
are seeking to protect the interests of their constituencies. 
State rules 
established 
A PUC clarifies or determines rules to be followed by carriers that provide services in that state. 
Company refusal 
for interconnection 
When, as reported by third parties to a government agency, a carrier does not facilitated 
interconnection with competing companies. When it is necessary for a government agency to 
intervene in a complaint about a denial for interconnection. CLEC complaints about failure to 
obtain interconnection under sec. 251. High rates are considered unwillingness to allow 
interconnection. Interconnection disputes among companies are considered unwillingness to 
provide interconnection. 
Individual company 
review 
When the FCC or a PUC reviews a company’s application for interconnection related issues 
such as requests for certain networks or tariffs for interconnection to be exempted. When an 
issue arises that only pertains to the company under review. Sec. 271 approval is considered 
an individual company review. The review can include satellite companies. When companies 
complain about another company that obtains certain conditions of which they disapprove. 
Federal rules yet to 
be determined 
Companies complain about an issue that the FCC has not yet decided. 
 
Appendix 2 
Universal service: operationalization of codes 
US funds received When it is stated that a company received funds from the US fund. Also when the organization 
that provides the funds states the amount of funds available for support. Funds can also be 
made available to individuals. When there are announcements concerning the distribution of 
funds and potential concerns regarding eligible it items. 
State rules to be 
determined 
When state legislation is still being written or there is debate around an issue that a state has to 
settle. 
Federal rules 
established 
When the FCC sets up organizations to manage the USF. When there is a decision in the 
Senate or House about universal service. Speeches are not coded. Studies by consulting 
companies are not coded. 
Not coded Administrative information such as data requests from carriers is not coded. Journalist opinions 
are not coded. 
 
